The Empirics of Child Custody by Ryznar, Margaret
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
5-1-2017
The Empirics of Child Custody
Margaret Ryznar
Indiana University McKinney School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Family Law Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Margaret Ryznar, The Empirics of Child Custody, 65 Clev. St. L. Rev. 211 (2017)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss2/7
 
 
 
211 
THE EMPIRICS OF CHILD CUSTODY  
MARGARET RYZNAR* 
ABSTRACT 
 
Child custody issues are as American as apple pie, with only a quarter of children 
seeing their parents married until the end. The legal standard for custody is the best 
interests of the child, but the greyness of this inquiry allows courts to make difficult 
judgments. In family law, such discretionary standards govern factually diverse 
cases and make it difficult to draw conclusions from individual cases. This Article 
offers an objective measurement in family law by empirically examining a sample of 
Indiana divorce cases filed during three months in 2008 that involved children. The 
resulting analysis of child custody and visitation awards reveals the current 
understanding of the child’s best interests and the role of judicial discretion, 
illuminating both national and local trends in family law.         
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Child custody issues have become as American as apple pie. If demographic 
trends continue, only a quarter of children will see their parents married until the 
end. Almost half of all marriages will end in divorce,1 and almost half of children 
will not be born within a marriage, with both scenarios presenting child custody 
questions.2   
                                                          
 * Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University McKinney School of Law. Thanks to 
Jessica Dickinson, Tarica LaBossiere, and Susan David deMaine, Assistant Director for 
Information Services at the Ruth Lilly Law Library, for their excellent research assistance. 
 1  “[E]stimated divorce rates hover between 35% and 50%.” Molly J. Walker Wilson, 
Legal and Psychological Considerations in Adolescents’ End-of-Life Choices, 110 NW. U. L. 
REV. ONLINE 33, 44 n.67 (2015). 
 2  See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig, Substantive Parenting Arrangements in the USA: 
Unpacking the Policy Choices, 27 CHILD & FAM. L. Q. 2, 2 (2015) (“Although the US divorce 
rate has continued to fall since its peak in 1981, to about what it was in 1970, as long as the 
birth rate remains constant, the rate of disputes involving children is likely to rise. The rate of 
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When parents seek custody and visitation, the protection of children is 
paramount.3 Historically, courts and legislators encouraged parents to stay married 
for the sake of their children.4 Since divorce has become commonplace, the 
discussion has moved onto protecting children in the event of their parents’ divorce.   
The child’s best interests standard is the modern approach to many child-related 
matters. This standard allows for judicial discretion and individualized 
determinations as to which parent would best serve a child’s needs.5 The standard is 
flexible and consists of several factors that together represent the child’s best 
interests.6 While the factors themselves are clear, how judges piece them together to 
decide custody can be less so.  
While judges originally had significant discretion over child-related matters, the 
trend has been to limit it. The national example is the child support guidelines, a 
formulaic approach to calculating child support prompted by Congress to protect 
children.7 Another example is the visitation time guidelines adopted by a few states 
to determine not only how much visitation time a parent should receive, but even 
which parent should trick-or-treat with the children on Halloween.8 Indiana is one of 
the states that has moved to such parenting time guidelines.9 
                                                                                                                                         
marriage has decreased while coupling has not, and the unwed birth rate has increased 
dramatically since 1960, so that in 2010 it was about 41%.”) (internal footnotes omitted). 
 3  In the United States alone, it is estimated that “one million children live with parents 
who are in the midst of a divorce each year.” Rebecca Love Kourlis et al., Special Feature: 
IAALS’ Honoring Families Initiative: Courts and Communities Helping Families in 
Transition Arising from Separation or Divorce, 51 FAM. CT. REV. 351, 356 (2013) (internal 
footnote omitted). 
 4  Divorce has been viewed as harmful to the children impacted. See, e.g., D. KELLY 
WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW 689 (Erwin Chemerinsky et al. 
eds., 6th ed. 2016) (“Wallerstein’s follow-up studies (after 10 and 25 years) find continued 
negative effects: one-third of the children had psychological problems (e.g., clinical 
depression), poor academic performance, and difficulties in maintaining intimate interpersonal 
relationships. A study by psychologist Mavis Hetherington and John Kelly confirms that 
divorce has long-term consequences for children. However, these authors have considerable 
more optimism about these effects based on the resiliency of children.”). 
 5  Elizabeth Scott & Andre Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 455, 466 
(1984). 
 6  Michael J. Waxman, Children’s Voices and Fathers’ Hearts: Challenges Faced in 
Implementing the “Best Interests” Standard, 26 ME. B.J. 71, 71-72 (2011) (noting the 
difficulties in applying the standard). 
 7  The Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-69 (2000 & 
Supp. 2005), required states to establish numerical formulas to help judges set child support 
awards. If the states did not have the guidelines by 1987, they would have lost a percentage of 
federal welfare funds. The Family Support Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 667, required states to 
use the guidelines as a rebuttable presumption for child support awards. ROBERT H. MNOOKIN 
& D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY, AND STATE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN 
AND THE LAW 195 (Chemerinsky et. al, Aspen Publishers 6th ed. 2009). The Guidelines differ 
by state and also by income level. 
 8  See infra Part III. 
 9  Id. 
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 Even given this legal framework, however, it is difficult to know what the courts 
are doing within it. An empirical analysis of child custody and visitation allows a 
glimpse into the landscape of family law today, important especially for litigants and 
lawmakers. Empirical data also enables confirmation of the trends in family law. 
Finally, an empirical analysis implicates the greater debate in family law regarding 
judicial discretion versus legislative mandate.   
This Article contributes by using descriptive statistics to take an empirical look at 
how the family law framework is implemented in practice by analyzing three months 
of divorce cases involving children that were filed in 2008 in Marion County, 
Indiana. To place this data into context, Part II begins by examining the statutory 
framework regarding child custody in Indiana, while Part III analyzes visitation. Part 
IV presents the empirical data, extracting lessons on the court’s practices in Indiana 
divorces in the context of the statutory framework. While this analysis involves only 
one set of data, it is useful to help illuminate the practices in the field of family law 
today. 
 II.  CHILD CUSTODY 
In order to put any empirical data into context, a brief analysis of Indiana law on 
child custody is useful. Indiana, like many states, has a statutory framework 
governing both legal and physical custody. While legal custody provides a parent 
with the power to make major decisions for the child, physical custody determines 
with which parent the child lives.10   
A.  Sole Custody 
There have been various child custody standards in the United States throughout 
history.11 Common law viewed children as property and presumed that the father was 
entitled to the control and custody of his legitimate minor children.12 When a custody 
dispute arose, the father’s rights received legal protection.13   
                                                          
 10  Legal custody includes the “right and obligation to make long range decisions 
involving education, religious training, discipline, medical care, and other matters of major 
significance concerning the child’s life and welfare.” McCarty v. McCarty, 807 A.2d 1211, 
1213 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) (quoting Taylor v. Taylor, 508 A.2d 964, 967 (Md. 1986)). 
Physical custody includes the “right and obligation to provide a home for the child and to 
make the day-to-day decisions required during the time the child is actually with the parent 
having such custody.” Id. (quoting Taylor, 508 A.2d at 967). Custody may be awarded in 
differing combinations based on the circumstances of each case. See, e.g., LaChapelle v. 
Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 168 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (affirming one parent’s sole physical 
custody and shared legal custody with another parent). 
 11  See generally Linda D. Elrod & Milfred D. Dale, Paradigm Shifts and Pendulum 
Swings in Child Custody: The Interests of Children in the Balance, 42 FAM. L.Q. 381 (2008). 
 12  MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY 
OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 50, 53 (1994); WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES 196 (Bernard C. Gavit ed., Wash. Law Book Co. 1941) (1892); Prather v. 
Prather, 4 S.C. Eq. (4 Des. Eq.) 33, 39 (1809) (“With respect to the children, I do not feel 
myself at liberty to take them out of the care and custody of the father. He is the natural 
guardian, invested by God and the law of the country, with reasonable power over them. 
Unless therefore his paternal power has been monstrously and cruelly abused, this court would 
be very cautious of interfering in the exercise of it.”). 
 13  Prather, 4 S.C. Eq. (4 Des. Eq.) at 39. 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
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Throughout the course of the nineteenth century, a newfound concern for the 
interests of young children in divorce proceedings gave rise to a presumption that 
favored mothers.14 This “tender years” doctrine viewed the mother as best able to 
care for children.15 
Cultural changes in the twentieth century resulted in the primary caretaker 
presumption, which was facially gender-neutral in holding that the parent who did 
the majority of care for the child should receive custody.16 Under this presumption, 
the parent receiving custody was often still the mother because traditional gender 
roles meant that mothers frequently were the primary caregivers.17   
Finally, states moved to the current child’s best interests standard, which is 
gender-neutral and has the additional benefit of being focused on the outcome that 
would benefit children the most.18 The best interests standard promotes fairness and 
equality between the parents by acknowledging that both have rights regarding their 
children.19 However, the child’s best interests standard has not escaped criticism for 
being unpredictable and encouraging litigation.20 
                                                          
 14  David D. Meyer, The Constitutional Rights of Non-Custodial Parents, 35 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 1461, 1468 (2006). 
 15  See, e.g., Sheehan v. Sheehan, 143 A.2d 874, 882 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1958). But 
see D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW 707-08 
(Chemerinsky et. al, Aspen Publisher 5th ed. 2013) (“The little boy is very cute and just as 
red-headed as his dad who has a pony-tail down to his waist. You know, when the father got 
temporary custody, that little boy was only about a few weeks old. The judge said to the 
father, ‘Mr. Fulk, how do you know how to take care of such a tiny baby?’ The father replied, 
‘I went to the library, ma’am, and read all about it.’”). 
 16  See MARTIN R. GARDNER, UNDERSTANDING JUVENILE LAW 47 (3d ed. 2009). 
 17  Id. at 46-47. 
 18  The future of custody will likely continue to revolve around the child’s best interests, 
but some have proposed new reforms in light of high levels of divorce and non-marital births. 
Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for Nonmarital Families, 67 
STAN. L. REV. 167, 227 (2015) (suggesting that states should adopt default rules that assign 
legal and physical custody to both parents at birth rather than wait until custody disputes are 
brought to the court).   
 19  Jo-Ellen Paradise, Note, The Disparity Between Men and Women in Custody Disputes: 
Is Joint Custody the Answer to Everyone’s Problems?, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 517, 532 (1998). 
 20  Mary Jean Dolan & Daniel J. Hynan, Abstract, Fighting Over Bedtime Stories: An 
Empirical Study of the Risks of Valuing Quantity Over Quality in Child Custody Decisions, 38 
L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 45, 45 (2013-2014).  
The well-established “best interest test,” a multi-factor qualitative inquiry, has long 
been criticized for its indeterminacy. According to its many detractors, because 
outcomes are unpredictable, this test leads to increased parental conflict, expensive 
litigation, and unfair bargaining tactics. The proposed remedy is to allocate post-
divorce custody shares based on the percentage of time that each parent spent on 
childcare tasks before separating. 
Id. 
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 Courts in the United States today determine child custody by relying on the 
child’s best interests standard.21 Each state has a list of factors, whether defined 
through legislation or case law, that together compose the child’s best interests.22   
Indiana’s best interests statute is typical of those used in other states23 in that it 
abandons a presumption in favor of either parent and instead requires the court to 
consider all relevant factors.24 Such factors include the age and sex of the child; the 
wishes of the child’s parents; the child’s wishes, especially if the child is at least 
fourteen years of age; the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the 
parents and siblings; the child’s adjustment to the home, school, and community; the 
mental and physical health of all people involved; evidence of a pattern of domestic 
or family violence by either parent; and evidence that a de facto custodian cared for 
the child.25 
A parent may request modification of the custody arrangement based on a change 
in circumstances. Indiana code, like many other states, allows for a change of 
custody when (1) modification is in the best interests of the child, and (2) there is a 
substantial change in at least one of the factors that the court may consider in 
initially determining custody.26 Thus, the best interests standard also governs 
modifications of custody.  
                                                          
 21  For a background on the American best interests standard, see John C. Lore III, 
Protecting Abused, Neglected, and Abandoned Children: A Proposal for Provisional Out-of-
State Kinship Placements Pursuant to the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, 
40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 57, 64 n.23 (2006); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303-04 (1993) 
(“The best interests of the child,’ a venerable phrase familiar from divorce proceedings, is a 
proper and feasible criterion for making the decision as to which of two parents will be 
accorded custody.”). However, “[t]he American Law Institute proposes that in contested 
physical custody cases, the court should allocate to each parent a proportion of the child’s 
time that approximates the proportion of time each spent performing caretaking functions in 
the past.” Richard A. Warshak, Parenting by the Clock: The Best-Interests-of-the-Child 
Standard, Judicial Discretion, and the American Law Institute’s “Approximation Rule,” 41 U. 
BALT. L. REV. 83, 83 (2011); see also A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 
§ 2.08, 197-99 (2015).    
 22  Robert F. Harris, A Response to the Recommendations of the UNLV Conference: 
Another Look at the Attorney/Guardian Ad Litem Model, 6 NEV. L.J. 1284, 1292 (2006).  
At this juncture all states and territories in the U.S. have adopted some form of best 
interests standard for their courts to employ in making decisions about custody, 
placement, and/or the termination of parental rights. However, states vary widely in 
the amount of guidance their statutes give when defining best interests. Some statutes 
list extensive best interest factors relating to the child-in-context that provide 
sufficient direction to prevent lawyers from exercising unbridled discretion. These 
statutes also leave lawyers enough flexibility to meet the unique needs of individual 
children. 
Id. 
 23  See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3 (West 2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23 
(West 2011). 
 24  IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-8 (West 2016). 
 25  Id. 
 26  IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-21 (West 2016). 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
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Despite the shifts in the cultural and social assumptions underlying the various 
standards used to determine child custody, support for sole custody remained 
constant.27 Sole custody allowed the court to designate a single custodial parent to 
legally determine the child’s education, religious upbringing, and medical treatment 
in addition to attending to the child’s day-to-day activities and care.28 The 
noncustodial parent assumed a secondary position in the child’s life, removed from 
decision-making authority and limited to visitation rights with the child.  However, 
this paradigm shifted with the trend across the country toward joint custody. 
B. Joint Custody 
Joint custody allows both parents to share custody despite separation29 and has 
been the trend across the United States since the late twentieth century.30 Joint 
custody may be legal, physical, or both,31 but does not necessarily require equal 
                                                          
 27  Meyer, supra note 14, at 1469. 
 28  Id. 
 29  Joint custody has been emerging in other legal systems as well. See, e.g., Robert 
Emery, Special Issue: Global Family Law: Editorial Note, 51 FAM. CT. REV. 520, 521 (2013) 
(“Joint custody is also on the rise in Italy, mostly joint legal custody, a relatively new concept 
in Italian law.”). Further:  
The notion that parents could share custody had great appeal to a variety of parties. 
Judges could avoid the difficult task of choosing between two fit parents, family law 
could reduce or eliminate the acrimony inspired by the traditional winner/loser 
custody model, both parents would be respected and encouraged to spend significant 
time with their children, and children would benefit from the continuing involvement 
of both parents. 
Cynthia Lee Starnes, Lovers, Parents, and Partners: Disentangling Spousal and Co-Parenting 
Commitments, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 197, 222 (2012). But see Sol R. Rappaport, Deconstructing 
the Impact of Divorce on Children, 47 FAM. L.Q. 353, 377 (2013) (arguing for the rejection of 
“sole” and “joint” terminology because it means more to the parents than the decision 
makers). 
 30  “[L]egislators tend to favor presumptions toward joint custody (not necessarily equal 
custody) in custody determinations absent evidence that joint custody would be detrimental to 
the child.” Elizabeth A. Pfenson, Note, Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen?: The Potential 
Concerns of Finding More Parents and Fewer Legal Strangers in California’s Recently-
Proposed Multiple-Parents Bill, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2023, 2040 (2013). Additionally:  
[O]ver the past two decades, the prevailing custody paradigm in regards to decision 
making and parenting-time schedules has shifted from sole custody to postseparation 
co-parenting. Joint custody has become more prevalent, in part because recent 
findings in social science supported changes in legislation and, on other occasions, the 
testimony of expert witnesses in favor of joint custody assisted judges to find that joint 
custody was in the best interest of each child. A primary benefit of joint custody is 
that it provides a way of giving children access to both parents while allowing parents 
freedom of divorce. 
Karen S. Adam & Stacey N. Brady, Fifty Years of Judging in Family Law: The Cleavers Have 
Left the Building, 51 FAM. CT. REV. 28, 31 (2013) (internal citations omitted).  
 31  See LINDA D. ELROD, CHILD CUSTODY PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5:1 (2015) 
(providing an overview of the multiple possible arrangements for joint custody and examining 
the different meanings of the term “joint custody” in various states); 1 THOMAS A. JACOBS, 
CHILDREN AND THE LAW: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS § 6:7 (2015) (listing key cases regarding 
joint custody from various states); Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Propriety of Awarding Joint 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss2/7
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sharing.32Almost every state now permits joint custody or has a presumption of joint 
custody;33 in 1975, only one state permitted joint custody.34 Indeed, joint custody has 
not only become an available option, but also the favored option in many states.35 
Joint custody garnered support because both parents could exercise their rights 
relating to their children,36 and children benefited from both parents.37 This paradigm 
                                                                                                                                         
Custody of Children, 17 A.L.R.4TH 1013 (1981 & Supp. 2015) (noting cases that have 
determined the propriety of awarding joint custody of children to both parents following the 
dissolution of a marriage). 
 32  See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-14 (West 2016) (“An award of joint legal custody 
under section 13 of this chapter does not require an equal division of physical custody of the 
child.”). 
 33  Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law: Working 
Toward More Uniformity in Laws Relating to Families, 44 FAM. L.Q. 469, 511 (2011); see, 
e.g., IDAHO CODE § 32-717B(4) (2006) (“[A]bsent a preponderance of the evidence to the 
contrary, there shall be a presumption that joint custody is in the best interests of a minor child 
or children.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.169(3) (2011) (presuming joint custody is preferable 
when “both parents agree to the terms and conditions of the order”). Critics have pointed out 
that this is undesirable in cases of domestic abuse. See, e.g., Janet R. Johnston & Nancy Ver 
Steegh, Historical Trends in Family Court Response to Intimate Partner Violence: 
Perspectives of Critics and Proponents of Current Practices, 51 FAM. CT. REV. 63, 68 (2013). 
 34  But see Jana B. Singer & William L. Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint Custody, 47 MD. L. 
REV. 497, 518 (1988) (noting some issues concerning joint custody). 
 35  J. Herbie DiFonzo, From the Rule of One to Shared Parenting: Custody Presumptions 
in Law and Policy, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 213, 217 (2014) (noting that forty-seven states and the 
District of Columbia have statutory provisions authorizing courts to award joint custody in 
one form or another (legal or physical), with the remaining states permitting these orders 
through case law). 
 36  Sole custody led to a gap in the noncustodial parent’s relationship with the child, even 
though the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized parental rights under the 
Constitution. Although visitation does not extinguish parental rights, it alters them. “Due to 
this fundamental liberty interest, advocates for fathers’ rights began pushing for courts to 
award joint custody beginning in the late 1970s.” Erin Bajackson, Best Interests of the Child—
A Legislative Journey Still in Motion, 25 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 311, 323 (2013); see 
also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). But see Elizabeth Scott & Robert Emery, 
Gender Politics and Child Custody: The Puzzling Persistence of the Best-Interests Standard, 
77 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 76-78 (2014) (discussing political issues surrounding the 
push for joint custody and father advocacy groups).   
 37  Some research may suggest that children in sole custody homes have a harder time 
developing intimate relationships and suffer from depression and anxiety at a higher rate than 
those living with both parents. Paradise, supra note 19, at 555. But see Christy M. Buchanan 
& Parissa L. Jahromi, A Psychological Perspective on Shared Custody Arrangements, 43 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 419, 419 (2008) (“The custody arrangement that children live in 
following parental divorce is not a strong or especially important predictor of children’s 
subsequent mental, emotional, or behavioral well-being. . . . [C]hildren are more likely to 
thrive psychologically following divorce when they experience a family context characterized 
by . . . ongoing positive relationships with and effective parenting of at least one, preferably 
both, parents.”). 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
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furthers the child’s best interests to the extent that such interests require significant 
contact with each parent.38 However, it might not be a universal solution.39    
In addition to the child’s best interests,40 there are further considerations in the 
Indiana family law code for joint legal custody.41 The court should evaluate the 
fitness and suitability of those awarded joint custody; whether the parents can 
communicate and cooperate; the child’s wishes, especially if the child is at least 
fourteen years of age; whether the child has established a close and beneficial 
relationship with both parents; whether the parents live in close proximity to each 
other and plan to continue doing so; and the nature of the physical and emotional 
environment in each home.42 
Many joint legal custody decisions in Indiana, as across the United States, have 
turned on whether the parents can communicate with each other.43 As one court 
                                                          
 38  “Joint custody became the new standard of what was considered ‘in the best interests’ 
of the child.” Mary Ann Mason, The Roller Coaster of Child Custody Law Over the Last Half 
Century, 24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 451, 453 (2012). 
 39  See, e.g., Jennifer E. McIntosh, Special Issue, For the Sake of the Children: 
Collaborations Between Law and Social Science to Advance the Field of Family Dispute 
Resolution: Legislating for Shared Parenting: Exploring Some Underlying Assumptions, 47 
FAM. CT. REV. 389, 397 (2009) (“As researchers were concerned a decade ago about children 
growing up without substantive involvement of both parents, their questions now turn with the 
pendulum to children growing up in the ‘shared care era.’”). 
 40  IND. CODE ANN. 31-17-2-13 (West 2016). 
 41  For example, “the court shall consider it a matter of primary, but not determinative, 
importance that the persons awarded joint custody have agreed to an award of joint legal 
custody.” IND. CODE ANN. 31-17-2-15 (West 2016). 
 42  Id. 
 43  See, e.g., Arms v. Arms, 803 N.E.2d 1201, 1210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“In determining 
whether joint legal custody is appropriate, courts examine whether the parents have the ability 
to work together for the best interests of their children.”); Aylward v. Aylward, 592 N.E.2d 
1247, 1252 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (“The evidence overwhelmingly reveals a clear abuse of trial 
court discretion in that the joint custody award constitutes an imposition of an intolerable 
situation upon two persons who have made child rearing a battleground. We believe that the 
imposition of joint legal custody under the present circumstances is tantamount to the 
proverbial folly of cutting the baby in half in order to effect a fair distribution of the child to 
competing parents.”); Stamm v. Stamm, No. 21A05–0607–CV–401, 2007 WL 1673799 *9-10 
(Ind. Ct. App. June 12, 2007) (unpublished table decision) (“We have previously noted our 
reluctance to affirm a trial court’s order of joint legal custody when one of the parties objects. 
The obvious rational [sic] for such reluctance is that parties who do not want to work together 
in making fundamental decisions regarding their children are less likely to successfully reach 
agreements. . . . [Parties’] relationship is inescapably one for which joint legal custody is 
inappropriate. Although our conclusion that remand is necessary will result in one of the 
parents losing his or her rights relating to legal custody, this result is far preferable to the 
current arrangement, under which two parties who clearly cannot communicate and work 
together are jointly responsible for making fundamental decisions relating to their children’s 
upbringing. We reverse the trial court’s order that [parties] share joint legal custody and 
remand with instructions that the trial court decide which party shall have legal custody.”); 
Stutz v. Stutz, 556 N.E.2d 1346, 1351 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (illustrating that an award of joint 
legal custody was not an abuse of discretion based on a record that contained no evidence of 
parental disagreement relating to the upbringing of the daughter). 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss2/7
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stated, “The issue in determining whether joint legal custody is appropriate is not the 
parties’ respective parenting skills, but their ability to work together for the best 
interests of their children.”44 However, occasional or mild disagreements between 
the parents do not necessarily hurt their chances for joint legal custody.45    
Much work has been dedicated to increasing both parents’ role in parenting. For 
example, the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts (AFCC) convened a 
think tank of thirty-two family law experts—including legal experts, mental health 
practitioners, conflict resolution practitioners, educators, judges, court services 
administrators, and researchers—to examine the issues surrounding shared 
parenting.46 Its report shows how research, policy, and practice on shared parenting 
can be more effectively integrated.47 Illustrating the greyness in this area of family 
law, there have been various reactions to the report, with suggestions for other 
directions.48   
                                                          
 44  Carmichael v. Siegel, 754 N.E.2d 619, 636 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). “Even two parents 
who are exceptional on an individual basis when it comes to raising their children should not 
be granted, or allowed to maintain, joint legal custody over the children if it has been 
demonstrated, as here, that those parents cannot work and communicate together to raise the 
children. . . . The trial court here was placed in a position of choosing one parent over the 
other regarding legal custody, because of their inability to communicate and work together. . . 
.” Id. 
 45  See, e.g., Troyer v. Troyer, 987 N.E.2d 1130, 1147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (stating that 
the trial court acted within its discretion in awarding the parents joint legal custody of a 
twelve-year-old child, even though the child suffered from anorexia nervosa and a major 
depressive disorder and the father’s previous communications with the child had caused the 
child emotional distress; the court found that the parents had occasionally been able to 
cooperate for the child’s benefit, such as in making joint decisions regarding the child’s 
therapy and extracurricular activities); Swadner v. Swadner, 897 N.E.2d 966, 974 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2008) (explaining that joint legal custody of a child was appropriate despite the parents’ 
disagreements; while the parents disagreed on a few matters, they demonstrated their general 
ability to communicate and work together to raise their children, and each parent 
acknowledged the other’s love for their children and ability to care for the children; in 
granting a mother and father joint custody, courts must consider whether the parties can work 
together for the best interests of their children).     
 46  Marsha Kline Pruett & J. Herbie DiFonzo, Closing the Gap: Research, Policy, 
Practice, and Shared Parenting, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 152, 153 (2014). 
 47  Id. at 171 (noting that after all potential issues are addressed, shared parenting ensures 
“that children continue to be nurtured by parents whose collaboration sets a path for a strong 
family future”). 
 48  See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, Planning for Children and Resolving Custodial Disputes: 
A Comment on the Think Tank Report, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 200, 200 (2014) (suggesting that the 
application of the best interests standard when parents do not agree on custody is in tension 
with the goals and values of the report because it encourages parents to highlight each other’s 
deficiencies); Marsha Kline Pruett & J. Herbie DiFonzo, Advancing the Shared Parenting 
Debate, One Step at a Time: Responses to the Commentaries, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 207, 208 
(2014) (summarizing the critiques that have been made regarding the AFCC Think Tank 
report); Maria Cognetti & Nadya Chmil, Shared Parenting—Have We Really Closed the Gap? 
A Comment on AFCC’s Think Tank Report, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 181, 184-85 (2014) 
(questioning some of the consensus points of the Think Tank Report, particularly in regard to 
the term “custody”). 
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In sum, the trend in U.S. family law has favored increased focus on children and 
the involvement of both parents. Part IV analyzes data from the Marion County, 
Indiana divorce cases filed in three months of 2008 that involved children to confirm 
whether this trend holds true in Indiana as well.    
 III.  VISITATION 
If the court awards sole custody, then the noncustodial parent may receive 
visitation rights. Thus, child custody may be only part of the child-related 
determinations.  
A.  The Visitation Legal Framework 
When the parents of a child separate,49 they might receive joint legal and physical 
custody of the child.50 If only one parent receives physical custody of the child, 
however, the noncustodial parent is entitled to reasonable visitation.51  
This arrangement is the natural result of the constitutional protection afforded to 
parents of the care, custody, and control of their children by the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution.52 Although family law typically remains in the 
domain of the states,53 the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the parent-child 
relationship is constitutionally protected54 from certain state restrictions.55 
                                                          
 49  The Indiana approach to visitation in the form of the Parenting Time Guidelines is 
“applicable to all child custody situations, including paternity cases and cases involving joint 
legal custody where one person has primary physical custody.” IND. PARENTING TIME 
GUIDELINES, PREAMBLE (DOMESTIC RELATIONS COMM. 2013). 
 50  See supra Part II. 
 51  See, e.g., Janousek v. Janousek, 485 N.Y.S.2d 305, 308 (N.Y App. Div. 1985) (“It is 
well-settled that a noncustodial parent should have reasonable rights of visitation, and that the 
denial of such rights is such a drastic remedy that an order doing so should be based on 
substantial evidence that visitation would be detrimental to the welfare of the child.”).  
 52  See Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (determining that the 
parents’ right to choose private over public education is a fundamental liberty interest 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) 
(finding that the parents’ decision to hire a foreign language teacher for their child is a 
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment); Santosky v. Kramer, 
455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (noting that the freedom of personal choice in matters of family life 
is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment). Accordingly, the 
“parental liberty interest” permits parents to direct the upbringing of their children. See, e.g., 
Kandice K. Johnson, Crime or Punishment: The Parental Corporal Punishment Defense—
Reasonable and Necessary, or Excused Abuse?, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 413, 425 (1998) (noting 
that the parent-child relationship creates a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest that allows 
parents to direct the upbringing of their children). 
 53  See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979) (“Family relations are a traditional 
area of state concern.”). 
 54  Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, reh’g denied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978) (“We have 
recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is 
constitutionally protected.”). 
 55  See Margaret Ryznar, Note, Adult Rights as the Achilles’ Heel of the Best Interests 
Standard: Lessons in Family Law from Across the Pond, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1649, 1677 
(2007). 
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Just as in custody determinations, the child’s best interests determine the child’s 
visitation with the noncustodial parent.56 Accordingly, courts have significant 
discretion in visitation orders, including the time, place, and circumstances of 
visitation.57 
Eventually, the nomenclature changed in Indiana and a few other states because 
of the perception that the term “visitation” denied that noncustodial parents remained 
parents58 and that the term focused on the adult, not the child.59 Thus, the term for 
visitation in Indiana, along with many other states, became “parenting” time.60   
There is a debate on how much parenting time is appropriate. To assist, 
psychologists have offered suggestions on how to best structure parenting time.61 A 
minority of states, including Indiana, has moved toward instating guidelines to 
ensure a minimum amount of parenting time.62 
                                                          
 56  See, e.g., Morocho v. Jordan, 999 N.Y.S.2d 172, 173 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014). 
 57  WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 4, at 732. 
 58  The Parenting Time Guidelines use the words “parenting time” instead of the word 
“visitation” in order to “emphasize the importance of the time a parent spends with a child.” 
IND. PARENTING TIME GUIDELINES, PREAMBLE CMT. (DOMESTIC RELATIONS COMM. 2013). 
 59  Randall T. Shepard, Elements of Modern Court Reform, 45 IND. L. REV. 897, 900 n.17 
(2012) ((citing 2005 Ind. Acts 1582) (concerning the rights of a noncustodial parent, to 
substitute “parenting time” for “visitation”) (amending IND. CODE § 31-17-4-1 (2016))) 
[hereinafter Shepard, Elements]. 
 60  2005 Ind. Acts 1582 (concerning the rights of a noncustodial parent, to replace 
“visitation” with “parenting time”) (amending IND. CODE § 31-17-4-1 (2016)). 
[F]or many years it was common to speak of divorces, child custody proceedings, and 
visitation rights. Seeking even simple ways to mitigate the acrimony for which these 
disputes are famous, Indiana has been at the forefront of redefining these concepts as 
dissolutions of marriage and parenting time. Recognizing that children benefit from 
frequent, continuing, and meaningful contact with both parents, and that scheduling 
time is more difficult between separate households the heads of which may not be on 
good terms, the Indiana Supreme Court adopted Parenting Time Guidelines for 
resolving disputes over children and ensuring that both parents have time to be just 
that to their children. The shift in emphasis away from the rights of adults and toward 
the needs of children eventually led the Indiana General Assembly to abolish the idea 
of “visitation.”  
 Shepard, Elements, supra note 59, at 900. 
 61  “Child development and divorce research of the past twenty-five years provides ample 
evidence that the traditional alternating weekend visiting pattern failed to meet the psychosocial 
and emotional needs of many separated children in both the short and longer-term.” Joan B. 
Kelly, Developing Beneficial Parenting Plan Models for Children Following Separation and 
Divorce, 19 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 237, 237 (2005).  
 62  See, e.g., MICHIGAN PARENTING TIME GUIDELINE, (PARENTING TIME ADVISORY COMM.); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4A-9 (2012). 
Although a few states have adopted visitation or parenting time guidelines that offer 
presumptive or minimum amounts of visitation to a noncustodial parent when parents 
cannot agree on a caretaking arrangement, the majority of states require courts to 
engage in individual fact-finding and adjudication to resolve contested custody and 
visitation cases. 
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 B. The Parenting Time Guidelines 
 The Indiana Supreme Court adopted the “Parenting Time Guidelines” in 2001.63 
The Guidelines represent the minimum recommended time a parent should have in 
order to maintain frequent, meaningful, and continuing contact with a child.64 While 
the child’s best interests influenced the Guidelines, children cannot set their own 
parenting plans.65  
According to the Preamble to the Guidelines,  
The Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines are based on the premise that it is 
usually in a child’s best interest to have frequent, meaningful and 
continuing contact with each parent. It is assumed that both parents 
nurture their child in important ways, significant to the development and 
well being of the child.66   
Since going into effect in 2001, the Guidelines underwent several amendments that 
took effect for all orders starting on March 1, 2013.67   
The amount of visitation provided by the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines is 
presumptively correct.68 However, courts can deviate from the Guidelines to award 
more parenting time, for example to allow both parents to have significant parenting 
time even though only one parent has sole custody.69 Alternatively, the courts can 
                                                                                                                                         
 Stacy Brustin & Lisa Vollendorf Martin, Paved with Good Intentions: Unintended 
Consequences of Federal Proposals to Integrate Child Support and Parenting Time, 48 IND. 
L. REV. 803, 832 (2015). 
 63  See, e.g., Julie E. Artis & Andrew V. Krebs, Family Law and Social Change: Judicial 
Views of Joint Custody, 1998-2011, 40 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 723, 728 (2015). 
 64  INDIANA PARENTING TIME GUIDELINES § 2 (DOMESTIC RELATIONS COMM. 2013). “In 
2008, the Division of State Court Administration printed 75,000 copies of the Indiana 
Parenting Time Guidelines in booklet format for distribution to trial courts with domestic 
relations jurisdiction.” Randall T. Shepard, The Self-Represented Litigant: Implications for the 
Bench and Bar, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 607, 614 (2010). 
 65  See, e.g., McElvain v. Hite, 800 N.E.2d 947, 950 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that 
a child’s threat to run away from home was insufficient cause to depart from the Indiana 
Parenting Time Guidelines, as the guidelines place responsibility on the parents to ensure the 
child’s compliance with the visitation guidelines and in no way allow for the child to make 
decisions on the parenting schedule). 
 66  INDIANA PARENTING TIME GUIDELINES, PREAMBLE (DOMESTIC RELATIONS COMM. 
2013).  
 67  Order Amending Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines (Jan. 4, 2013), 
http://www.in.gov/judiciary/files/order-rules-2013-0107-parenting.pdf. 
 68  INDIANA PARENTING TIME GUIDELINES (DOMESTIC RELATIONS COMM. 2013).  
 69  See, e.g., Tompa v. Tompa, 867 N.E.2d 158, 165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). 
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deviate from the Guidelines to protect the child70 or if the child’s best interests 
require it.71  
Additionally, parents can depart from the Guidelines to set their own custody and 
visitation arrangement if they meet certain minimum requirements.72 Indiana 
lawmakers encourage parents to create parenting plans for themselves,73 but they 
must protect the best interests of the child.74   
 Since going into effect in 2001, the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines have 
undergone amendments, with many of them being child-centered and requiring a 
spirit of cooperation between the parents.75 A noteworthy modification regarded 
shared custody arrangements over holiday periods.76 For example, amendments to 
the Holiday Parenting Time addressed the Christmas Break schedule and added 
President’s Day, Martin Luther King Day, and Fall Break as new holidays to be split 
between the parents.77 Furthermore, a parent could receive several consecutive 
weekends of custody in certain circumstances.78    
Another amendment to the Parenting Time Guidelines introduced the concept of 
parallel parenting, a temporary deviation from the Parenting Time Guidelines when 
the court determines that the parents are high conflict, such as if they are litigious, 
chronically angry or distrustful, or unable to communicate.79 In parallel parenting, 
                                                          
 70  See, e.g., Shady v. Shady, 858 N.E.2d 128, 137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (finding a 
deviation from the Parenting Time Guidelines warranted given a risk of abduction and 
potential harm). 
 71  See, e.g., Clary-Ghosh v. Ghosh, 26 N.E.3d 986 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), transfer denied 
sub nom; see also In re Marriage of Clary-Ghosh, 31 N.E.3d 975 (Ind. 2015) (determining that 
reducing the mother’s parenting time was in the best interests of the child and did not amount 
to a restriction of parenting time, which would require a showing that the child’s physical 
health would be endangered or the child’s emotional development would be impaired). But 
see In re Paternity of W.C., 952 N.E.2d 810, 817 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (finding that the trial 
court’s suspension of a mother’s parenting time with her special needs child was an abuse of 
discretion because noncustodial parents are guaranteed a right to visitation unless it is against 
the best interests of the child, and there was no evidence to demonstrate that the mother was 
endangering the child’s physical health or significantly impairing the child’s emotional 
development). 
 72  INDIANA PARENTING TIME GUIDELINES, PREAMBLE (DOMESTIC RELATIONS COMM. 
2013). 
 73  Id. 
Parents should consider these needs as they negotiate parenting time. They should be 
flexible and create a parenting time agreement which addresses the unique needs of 
the child and their circumstances. Parents and attorneys should always demonstrate a 
spirit of cooperation. The Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines are designed to assist 
parents and courts in the development of their own parenting plans. 
Id. 
 74  Id. 
 75  Id.  
 76  Id. at 20-21. 
 77  Id. at 20. 
 78  Id. at 23. 
 79  Id. 
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the parent with the child makes day-to-day decisions.80 Additionally, communication 
between the parents is limited and often in writing, and it is recommended that 
counseling professionals assist the parents with parallel parenting arrangements.81 
Parallel parenting thus limits the amount of communication that is required between 
the parents82 while preserving the child’s relationship with each parent. 
 In September 2016, the Indiana Supreme Court issued an order further amending 
the Guidelines, which took effect on January 1, 2017.83 The changes addressed 
parenting coordinators, clarifying their roles and responsibilities.84 The Guidelines 
define the court-appointed parenting coordination process as:  
[A] court ordered, child-focused dispute resolution process in which a 
Parenting Coordinator . . . assist[s] high conflict parties by accessing and 
managing conflicts, redirecting the focus of the parties to the needs of the 
child, and educating the parties on how to make decisions that are in the 
best interest of the child.85 
Parenting time guidelines do not necessarily take a nuanced approach to 
parenting time, and may fail to take into account “children’s ages, gender, and 
developmental needs and achievements, the history and quality of the child’s 
relationship with each parent, quality of parenting, and family situations requiring 
special attention.”86 However, the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines endeavor to 
take a more nuanced approach to parenting time based on age.87  
Under the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines, there is also an adjustment to the 
child support obligation of noncustodial parents who have a significant amount of 
overnight parenting time with their children.88 This credit offsets the money spent on 
children during parenting time. However, parents are not able to bargain custody or 
parenting time in exchange for child support.89   
                                                          
 80  Id. 
 81  Id. 
 82  Id. at 25-32. See, e.g., Bailey v. Bailey, 7 N.E.2d 340, 345 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) 
(determining that an agreement to enter into a Parallel Parenting Order when there is conflict 
between the parents was not a concession to modify child custody, and that the trial court 
erred in modifying child custody when there was no request from either parent to do so).    
 83  Order Amending Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines (Sept. 2, 2016), 
http://www.in.gov/judiciary/files/order-rules-2016-0902-parenting.pdf.   
 84  Id. 
 85  Id. 
 86  Kelly, supra note 61, at 239-40. 
 87  See, e.g., In re Paternity of K.R.H., 784 N.E.2d 985, 991 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (noting 
that although the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines provide courts with specific parenting 
time for children of a given age, they do not foreclose parents from agreeing, and being 
granted, additional or reduced parenting time as deemed reasonable). 
 88  See, e.g., Joseph W. Ruppert & Joni L. Sedberry, Recent Developments: Indiana 
Family Law, 40 IND. L. REV. 891, 914 (2007). 
 89  Perkinson v. Perkinson, 989 N.E.2d 758, 760 (Ind. 2013) (determining, on the grounds 
of public policy, that the parties could not agree to forego parenting time in exchange for relief 
from child support). 
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Several other factors affect parenting time determinations in Indiana. For 
example, as often happens with a mobile population,90 the relocation of one parent 
impacts existing arrangements.91 A parent planning to relocate with a child who is 
the subject of an existing custody order must file a motion with the court that issued 
the custody or parenting time order.92 It is possible for courts to modify the original 
parenting time or custody arrangement due to the relocation. Furthermore, domestic 
violence affects child custody and visitation decisions.93 
There is also an Indiana statute permitting grandparent visitation.94 However, the 
Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines do not apply to grandparents95 or to people 
formerly involved in an intimate relationship with one of the biological parents,96 
which is consistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedent protecting parental 
autonomy in the Constitution.97  
                                                          
 90  Linda D. Elrod, A Move in the Right Direction? Best Interests of the Child Emerging as 
the Standard for Relocation Cases, 3 J. CHILD CUSTODY 29, 30 (2006) (stating that an 
estimated twenty-five percent of custodial mothers moved within the first four years of their 
divorce). 
 91  This is true in many states. See, e.g., Paige M. Dempsey, Joint Custody and Relocation: 
The Supreme Court of Nebraska Limits Relocation of Parents Sharing Joint Custody in Brown 
v. Brown, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 185, 237 (2001). 
 92  IND. CODE § 31-17-2.2-1(a)(1) (2014). See, e.g., DeCloedt v. Wagaman, 15 N.E.3d 123, 
131 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (determining that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying mother’s petition to relocate because the father could demonstrate that the relocation 
was not in the child’s best interests). 
 93  For example, the Indiana code requires a rebuttable presumption of supervised  
parenting time for between one and two years if there is a crime involving domestic or family 
violence that was witnessed or heard by the child. As a condition of granting the noncustodial 
parent unsupervised parenting time, the court may require the noncustodial parent to complete 
a batterer’s intervention program certified by the Indiana coalition against domestic violence. 
IND. CODE § 31-17-2-8.3 (2011); see also Margaret Brinig et al., Perspectives on Joint 
Custody Presumptions as Applied to Domestic Violence Cases, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 271, 271 
(2014) (exploring “the implications of domestic violence for shared parenting and for the 
statutory legal and physical custody presumptions and exceptions which are triggered by or 
are applicable to domestic violence”). 
 94  IND. CODE § 31-17-5-1 (1997). 
 95  See, e.g., Woodruff v. Klein, 762 N.E.2d 223, 229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); K.M. v. K.F., 
42 N.E.3d 572, 582 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). 
 96  See K.S. v. B.W., 954 N.E.2d 1050, 1052 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that the trial 
court erred in granting visitation time to the mother’s former boyfriend because the Indiana 
Parenting Time Guidelines only apply to a child’s biological parents). But see Richardson v. 
Richardson, 34 N.E.3d 696, 701 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (confirming that a stepparent is entitled 
to visitation with a child, even under the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines, so long as the 
visitation is not to the detriment of the biological mother and father).  
 97  See supra note 52. But see Caban v. Healey, 634 N.E.2d 540, 543 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) 
(affirming visitation to a stepmother who had acted as the child’s parent for most of the 
child’s life); Collins v. Gilbreath, 403 N.E.2d 921 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that a court 
may grant visitation to a stepparent over objection of a natural parent if in the child’s best 
interests); see also Hoeing v. Williams, 880 N.E.2d 1217, 1221 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) 
(determining that the trial court erred in granting paternal grandmother visitation rights almost 
in conformity with the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines because while the Grandparent 
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 IV.  AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
With any legal framework, the question arises whether judicial decisions stay 
within it, and what the exact contours of those decisions are. While individual cases 
are useful, an analysis of their compilation reveals how much discretion courts use 
and how they use it.  
The results of such an analysis are helpful in many ways. They assist litigants in 
determining when and how to settle divorce cases on their own, especially because 
settlement may have a better effect on children than litigation.98 The empirical results 
also show courts and legislators the family law landscape created by their decisions, 
which otherwise can only be pieced together from individual state laws and court 
decisions. Finally, the results help confirm the major trends in family law, with many 
of them replicated in this data.  
A. The Empirical Data 
The data for this Article consists of divorces filed during three months in 2008 in 
Marion County, Indiana that involved minor children.99 The number of these cases 
totals approximately 110.  
These divorce records were coded for multiple variables, including who filed for 
the divorce, who received the marital home, how the pension was divided, how 
many children resulted from the marriage, who received custody of the children, and 
how parenting time was divided.    
In approximately half of these cases, the courts awarded joint legal custody,100 
requiring the parents to share major decisions about their children. However, in over 
half of the cases in the data, the court awarded primary physical custody to the 
mother, with the father often receiving parenting time.101  
A common amount of parenting time awarded in these Marion County divorce 
cases was 98 days, with approximately 25 noncustodial parents receiving that 
award.102 Another common parenting award was 52 days, with approximately fifteen 
                                                                                                                                         
Visitation Act provides that a grandparent may seek visitation rights, such visitation may not 
substantially impede on a parent’s fundamental right to control the upbringing of the child). 
 98  Judith G. Greenberg, Domestic Violence and the Danger of Joint Custody 
Presumptions, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 403, 407 (2005). 
The effects of joint custody on children in such families may be radically different 
from the effects on children whose parents did not agree to the joint custody, but for 
whom joint custody was ordered by a court. One would expect that families that 
choose joint custody have parents who get along better than those who prefer sole 
custody and that this ability to get along pre-divorce would continue postdivorce, 
producing better outcomes for the children. 
Id. 
 99  The data are on file with the author; the Marion County, Indiana cases analyzed were 
filed in January 2008, April 2008, and September 2008 [hereinafter Data on file with author]. 
 100  Id. 
 101  This has not differed from previous trends despite the recent increase in importance 
placed on fatherhood. See, e.g., Joan G. Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody 
Decrees, 94 YALE L.J. 757, 758 n.5 (1985) (citing studies showing that mothers obtained 
custody in most divorce cases). 
 102  Data on file with author. 
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noncustodial parents receiving that award.103  In several cases, the court awarded 
over 120 days of parenting time to the noncustodial parent, and in several others, 
awarded none.104  
There were child support arrearages in approximately one-third of the cases in 
the data.105 In many of them, the court awarded parenting time to the noncustodial 
parent.106   
 B. Implications 
The modern trend across the United States is to maintain the involvement of both 
parents to the greatest extent possible.107 There are two ways to do so. The first is 
through joint custody, and the second is through generous visitation in the event of a 
sole custody order.108 
Indiana seems to join the majority of states in recognizing the value of both 
parents’ involvement.109 In the majority of cases in the data, when the mother 
received primary custody of the children, the father received parenting time.110  
While Indiana has not joined those states with statutes favoring joint physical 
custody, the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines nonetheless encourage significant 
involvement of both parents, which resembles joint custody in some cases.111 The 
Guidelines favor dividing time between the parents, ensured by the Indiana courts in 
their parenting time awards. This aligns with the national trend of enabling both 
parents to stay involved.112 Thus, even when the Indiana courts do not offer joint 
custody, they award significant parenting time to the noncustodial parent.113 This 
                                                          
 103  Id. 
 104  Id. 
 105  Id. 
 106  Id. 
 107  See supra Part II. 
 108  But see Katherine Shaw Spaht, Developments in the Law: 1983-84, 45 LA. L. REV. 467, 
478, 483 n.51 (1984) (“The judgment in this case awarding joint custody but naming one 
parent as ‘domiciliary parent’ with the other parent having reasonable visitation rights is not 
truly joint custody. The judgment is in effect no different than the award of sole custody to 
one parent under the law as it formerly existed, except for the co-tutorship and exchange of 
information provisions of the article which by implication would be part of the judgment.”). 
 109  See supra Part II. 
 110  See supra Part IV.A. 
 111  “Another [Indiana] judge recognizes that although joint custody is not a statutory 
presumption, the Parenting Time Guidelines essentially create a presumption for joint 
custody.” Julie E. Artis & Andrew V. Krebs, Family Law and Social Change: Judicial Views 
of Joint Custody, 1998-2011, 40 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 723, 740 (2015). See also Miller v. 
Carpenter, 965 N.E.2d 104, 110-11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (finding that an increase in the 
father’s parenting time from around thirty-five percent to forty percent was not sufficiently 
substantial to require showing a substantial change for modification of physical custody, but 
the increase was still in the best interests of the child). 
 112  See supra Part II.  
 113  See generally supra Part II. 
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suggests that even states that do not have a joint custody presumption may still 
accommodate the involvement of both parents. 
The data also reflects adjustments to the child support obligation based on 
parenting time. Such a credit may incentivize parental involvement. To the extent 
that it does, states may consider implementing a parenting time credit or similar 
adjustment.  
The empirical data also confirms that child support arrearage does not prevent 
parenting time in Indiana. This aligns with the common public policy of encouraging 
visitation regardless of child support payment because of the benefits of visitation to 
the child. 
Finally, the empirical data illustrates that the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines 
have indeed influenced parenting time awards, which maintain the child’s 
relationship with the noncustodial parent. A common parenting time award was 98 
days.114 This award would include extended time in the summer, one night per week, 
and alternating weekends.115 Holidays rotate between the parties based on odd and 
even calendar years.116 Courts offer less parenting time for infants and toddlers.117  
However, Indiana remains in the minority in adopting parenting time guidelines to 
determine the child’s visitation time with the noncustodial parent. Indiana’s 
experience can serve as a model for other states interested in implementing similar 
guidelines. 
A formulaic approach to family law, such as parenting time guidelines, would 
capitalize on a generally understood and universally accepted understanding of the 
child’s best interests to the extent that it exists. On the other hand, individual justice 
is the entire point of divorce law. While predictability and consistency are gained by 
legislative formulae, courts can accomplish individual justice in divorce cases by 
having significant discretion.118  
Additionally, individual justice is the reason for having judicial oversight in 
divorce cases. In the United States, spouses cannot file paperwork to get divorced 
without court approval; the court’s oversight is necessary even if the couple chooses 
to reach a separation agreement.119 Just as the government regulates marriage,120 it 
regulates divorce.  
                                                          
 114  See supra Part IV.A. 
 115  INDIANA PARENTING TIME GUIDELINES § II.D. (DOMESTIC RELATIONS COMM. 2013). 
 116  Id. at II.F. 
 117  Id. at II.C. “Parenting time for infants and toddlers is broken down into two 
subcategories: (1) parenting time in early infancy and (2) parenting time in later infancy. 
These two subcategories are then even further broken down into several specific age ranges 
with schedules that incrementally increase the noncustodial parent’s visitation time.” Laurel 
W. Brenneise, Comment, I Love You, You Love Me, Can You Come Up with a Happy 
Visitation Schedule, Please?: Analyzing the Reform of Texas’s Parental Possession Schedule 
for Children Less Than Three Years of Age, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 499, 525 (2013).   
 118  “In deciding between a system of fixed rules and one of judicial discretion in family 
law disputes, the key issue on which to focus is the extent to which the family law system 
provides justice for the individual parties.” Theodore K. Cheng, A Call for A New Fixed Rule: 
Imposition of Child Support Orders Against Recipients of Means-Tested Public Benefits, 1995 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 647, 653 (1995). 
 119  Sally Burnett Sharp, Fairness Standards and Separation Agreements: A Word of 
Caution on Contractual Freedom, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1401-03 (1984).  
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Consequently, the question is how legislative formulae interact with judicial 
discretion. The empirical data suggests that while the Indiana courts generally follow 
legislative mandates, an amount of judicial discretion remains—cases have different 
results and diverge based on the facts. For example, several noncustodial parents in 
the data had zero days of parenting time, compared to several noncustodial parents 
who had over 120 days of parenting time. 
Indeed, there should be a healthy role for judicial discretion in divorce cases, but 
this is especially true when children are involved and need protection. Indeed, the 
flexibility of the child’s best interests standard requires judicial determination.121 
Child custody standards that did not rely on judicial discretion, such as 
presumptions, have historically failed.122  
The law must preserve judicial discretion to allow courts the flexibility to protect 
the child’s best interests, even if there is legislative involvement aiming to protect 
children as well. Indeed, judicial discretion and legislative guidance do not have to 
be mutually exclusive. As seen in the data, Indiana divorce cases generally conform 
to the legislative guidance, yet outliers exist when the child’s best interests require it.  
Any legislative guidance should thus preserve judicial discretion to help protect 
children in divorce cases. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
In sum, this Article analyzes empirical data from divorce cases filed during three 
months in 2008 that involved children in Marion County, Indiana. The aim of this 
analysis is to illuminate family law practice using descriptive statistics. In order to 
keep this data in context, this Article examines not only what the courts are doing in 
family law, but also the underlying law to analyze the correlation between the 
statutory framework and judicial decisions. This allows for a study of the interplay 
between legislative guidance and judicial discretion. 
The data from Marion County in Indiana confirms the trends seen in family law 
generally, with a push toward the involvement of both parents. Furthermore, by 
following the Parenting Time Guidelines, Indiana judges gain consistency and 
predictability in the average case. However, judges still maintain discretion to ensure 
the protection of the child’s best interests based on the circumstances of each family. 
The legal framework of the child’s best interests still guides the courts in the context 
of legislative guidance, providing a model to the majority of states that do not have 
                                                                                                                                         
  Within the past two decades, however, there has been an even greater demand for a 
minimizing of such state intervention and for a more unfettered application of simple 
contract principles to marital agreements. . . . Separation agreements . . . have tended 
to be swept into both the argument and the conclusion that marital contracts should, in 
general, be accorded the same judicial treatment as any other contract. 
Id. 
 120  For example, relatives closer than first cousins cannot marry, and first cousins can 
marry once they reach sixty-five years of age. IND. CODE § 31-11-1-2 (1997). Other 
government regulations and restrictions on marriage have fallen over the decades. See, e.g., 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (2015) (prohibiting states from banning same-
sex marriage); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (prohibiting states from banning 
interracial marriage).       
 121  See supra Part II. 
 122  Id. 
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parenting time guidelines, but would like to implement them. Future empirical work 
should continue to illuminate the dynamic family law field today.           
In sum, it is important to preserve judicial discretion so that judges may continue 
to take a case-by-case approach to custody determinations, increasing the likelihood 
of preserving the child’s best interests. However, judicial discretion and legislative 
guidance are not mutually exclusive, with both the courts and the legislatures able to 
work together to protect children’s best interests in divorce cases.  
20https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss2/7
